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1. This article will discuss the protection of moral rights under copyright law in both
the Netherlands and the United States. In doing so, a comparison will be drawn between
the level of protection provided in both countries. The title of this article is a nudge to that
comparison by referencing two of the most well-renowned and influential artists of both coun-
tries. Johannes Vermeer (1632-1675) was one of the most influential Dutch painters during
the Golden Age. Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) was an American painter and a major figure
in the abstract expressionist movement.
* Nicoline A. van de Haterd is a 2019 J.D. candidate at Duquesne University School of
Law. She graduated with honors from the University of Tilburg, the Netherlands, with a
LLM in Law & Technology and a LLB in International and European Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a sculptor and you created a sculpture to put on
display in your front yard. One day your neighbor, who is an art
director at a museum, knocks on your door. He saw the sculpture
in your front yard, and he tells you that he likes your work of art
and wants to buy it to display in the museum. Excited about the
opportunity to exhibit your work, you agree. However, a week later
you stop by the museum to look at your work and notice that the
plaque on the wall does not list you as the maker of the work. In-
stead, the sculptor is listed as "Unknown."
Under American copyright law, is there anything you can do?
What if the museum lists you as the sculptor of the work, but de-
cides to modify your sculpture by painting it red? Is there anything
you can do? The answer to both questions is yes. Namely, as the
author of a work, aside from copyright protection for infringement,
you as the maker of a certain type of work receive protection in the
form of "moral rights."2 Moral rights are rights that protect the in-
tegrity of the author's work from modifications, in addition to
providing the author with the right to be recognized as the creator
of the work.3 The former is also referred to as the "right of integ-
rity," while the latter is commonly known as the "right of attribu-
tion."
4
But what if you are not a sculptor, and are instead an architect-
you design a building and once the building is built, the owner de-
cides to change the faqade of the building and seeks to implement
further modifications. Can you, as the creator of the building, now
act? Under United States copyright law the answer is no, as moral
rights protection is not extended to architectural works.5 Addition-
ally, other forms of art, such as films or musical compositions, are
also not granted moral rights protection in the United States.6 Con-
versely, under Dutch law any copyrightable work is granted moral
rights protection.
7
2. See LYDIA P. LOREN & JOSEPH S. MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 425 (5th ed. 2017).
3. Id. at 323.
4. Id. For a further discussion on moral rights see infra Section II-B.
5. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012).
6. Id.
7. See Articles 1, 10 and 25 Auteurswet [Copyright Act] (Neth.).
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A. History of Dutch Copyright Law
For as small as the country is, the Netherlands8 has played a sig-
nificant role in the history of art in Continental Europe. While
Dutch art started to make a name in Europe as early as the Fif-
teenth and Sixteenth Centuries, it really flourished during the Sev-
enteenth Century, also known as the Dutch Golden Age.9 During
the Golden Age, the Netherlands experienced an enormous growth
in trade, science, and the arts. Between five and ten million works
of art had been produced in the Netherlands during this period, alt-
hough less than one percent actually survived.10 After the Eighty
Years' War with Spain ended in 1648, the country "emerged as a
vital new political, economic, and cultural force."11  The sudden
growth in the production of art is often attributed to the economic
growth the country experienced during this time period.12 In addi-
tion, while art was initially seen as a luxury only affordable to the
elite, during the Seventeenth Century art became part of the com-
mon Dutch household.13
Following the Golden Age and the growth of Dutch art and the
Dutch art market, the need to recognize the efforts of creators grew.
In 1803, the Dutch enacted their first national legislation, through
the Boekenwet van 1803,14 to protect the publisher, not the author,
against unlawfully made copies of the printed work.15 A similar law
had already been in force in the northern parts of the Netherlands
since 1796.16 The Boekenwet was soon followed by the first national
law governing copyright protection in general, the Dutch Copyright
Act of 1817.17 In 1881, a newer version of the Dutch Copyright Act
8. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is home to over 17 million people yet its slightly less
than twice the size of the State of New Jersey. The World Factbook, Europe: Netherlands,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/nl.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2019).
9. A Brief Overview of the Dutch Art Market in the Seventeenth Century, ESSENTIAL
VERMEER, http://www.essentialvermeer.com/dutch-painters/dutch-art/ecnmcs-dtchart.html





14. Translation in English: The Booklaw of 1803.
15. CHRIS F. SCHRIKS, HET KOPIJRECHT, 16DE TOT 19DE EEUW [Copyright from the Six-
teenth till Nineteenth century] 951-52 (2010).
16. Id. at 862, 864 (The Province of Holland revised its original decree of 1795 into the
law of 1796, providing the province with its first definitive "Book law." The law was mainly
focused on the book trade and sought to provide the publisher with the right to protect orig-
inal works to which he held the "copyright").
17. Id. at 1264; see also id. at 1266 (Although expectations were high, when it came to
the execution of the law, the northern parts of the Netherlands treated it primarily as before,
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came into force.1 8 However, in 1912, an updated copyright law, the
Copyright Act of 1912, was enacted based on the Berne Conven-
tion 19 of 1886.20 This act is still the law in the Netherlands today,
although in the past decades, the law was amended to take modern
changes and technologies into account.21 In 2008, because the Cop-
yright Act of 1912 had gone through several amendments, the
Dutch legislature decided to remove any reference to its original
enactment date and now the Act is simply referred to as the "Copy-
right Act.
'22
The Netherlands has a rich art history. From as early as the Fif-
teenth Century with Hieronymus Bosch, to the Dutch masters of
the Golden Age-Rembrandt van Rijn, Jan Steen and Johannes
Vermeer, and more modern artists such as Vincent van Gogh and
Piet Mondriaan-the country continuously has been on the fore-
front of the development of art and recognizing the rights of au-
thors. An important aspect of copyright and the recognition of au-
thor's rights are moral rights. While moral rights protection in Eu-
rope in general is broader than in the United States,23 the Nether-
lands provides for a good middle ground between the countries. As
will become evident throughout this article, the Netherlands af-
fords for a broader level of moral rights protection than the United
States by providing moral rights protection for more types of art
than just "fine art." Furthermore, the Netherlands' moral rights
protection is not as broad as some countries', such as France's or
Germany's. Therefore, considering the Dutch's centuries-old lead-
ing role in the creation of art and its moderate approach to the pro-
tection of authors' rights, the Netherlands forms an excellent point
of reference to change the way the United States views and protects
moral rights of integrity and attribution.
B. United States Copyright Office Notice
On January 23, 2017, the United States Copyright Office issued
a notice in which it requested comments from the public on how
not as a law protecting authors, but as a law protecting publishers. The south of the Neth-
erlands adhered more to the French approach).
18. D.W.F. VERKADE, T&C IE, COMMENTAAR OPAANHEFAUTEURSWET [Commentary on
the exordium to the Dutch Copyright Act] para. 1 (2017) (Neth.).
19. See discussion infra at Section Il-B-i.
20. VERKADE, supra note 18.
21. Id. at para. 1, 3.
22. Id. at para. 1.
23. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 323.
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existing United States laws protect the moral rights of authors.24
The Copyright Office's request is part of a public study that reviews
the current state of U.S. law recognizing and protecting the moral
rights of attribution and integrity.25 As part of its study, the Copy-
right Office "will review existing law on the moral rights of attribu-
tion and integrity, including provisions from Title 17 of the Unites
States Code as well as other federal and state laws," and determine
whether any additional protection would be advisable.26 To support
the Office's research and to provide thorough assistance to Con-
gress, the Copyright Office has enlisted the public for input on sev-
eral questions.
27
In 2014, as part of a review of U.S. copyright law, members of the
Subcommittees on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet,
of the House Judiciary Committee, held a hearing in which they
expressed an interest in evaluating the status of protection of moral
rights of authors in the United States as part of its review of U.S.
copyright law in general.28  In particular, the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee noted that the focus should be on
whether the current law sufficiently protects the moral rights of au-
thors, or whether more explicit protection is required.29 At the end
of the two-year copyright review hearings process, it was recom-
mended that the United States Copyright Office conduct a study on
the current status of moral rights protection laws in the United
States and whether any changes would be necessary and appropri-
ate.
3o
In preparation for this study, the Copyright Office co-hosted a
symposium on moral rights in April 2016 to hear views about cur-
rent issues in this area and to serve as the start of the Copyright
Office's public study.3 1 Discussions included the history of moral
rights, the value of moral rights for authors, protection under the
current law, and considerations for the digital age.32 Participants
varied from academic scholars to professional artists, musicians,
and performers.33 The right of attribution was identified by many
participants as important for authors from both an economic and





28. Id. at 7871.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 7871, 7874.




personal perspective.3 4 However, opinions varied as to the suffi-
ciency of protection under the current law. Several participants
found the existing law to be limited, strict, and under-inclusive,
while other participants found the current patchwork of laws to pro-
vide adequate protection.3 5 Another point of focus was moral rights
protection and litigation in foreign countries.
3 6
The Copyright Office's notice sought public comments on a vari-
ety of topics, including the effectiveness of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) and Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) in the
promotion and protection of moral rights in the United States,
whether any improvements should be made to the DMCA or VARA,
and how foreign countries approach the protection of moral rights
and if they can be implemented in the United States.
3 7
C. Scope of Article
The premise of this article is that the moral rights of authors in
the United States are currently not sufficiently protected and that
additional protection is necessary by implementing aspects of moral
rights protection from the Netherlands. Compared to the United
States, Europe has traditionally offered a broader scope of protec-
tion of moral rights of authors and artists.38 However, within Eu-
rope, the scope of protection of moral rights varies as the European
Union has not harmonized its laws regarding moral rights protec-
tion.3 9 This means that apart from the minimum requirements set
out by the Berne Convention,4 0 every country has its own legislation
regarding the recognition and protection of moral rights for authors.
The Netherlands provides for a good middle ground in the recog-
nition and protection of moral rights. Through the Auteurswet,41
the Netherlands provides for a broader scope of protection than the
United States, but is not as unlimited as, for instance, France.
4 2
This article will focus on three elements of a notice by the United




37. Id. at 7874-75; see also Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity,
COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
38. See generally 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8D.02 at 1-2 (2018).
39. See generally GUY TRITTON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 469 (3rd ed.
2008).
40. See discussion infra Section Il-B-i.
41. Auteurswet [Copyright Act] 1912 (Neth.).
42. See discussion infra Section IV.
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the United States: the effectiveness of the VARA and DMCA in the
promotion and protection of moral rights in the United States; how
moral rights are protected in the Netherlands; and improvements
that should be made to existing U.S. law by looking at how Dutch
law can be implemented in the United States. In particular, this
article will advocate that existing U.S. law governing the protection
of moral rights should be extended, using the Netherlands as a ref-
erence.
The article will begin by briefly explaining copyright, moral
rights, and the types of moral rights. Second, there will be an ex-
planation of existing copyright and moral rights law in the United
States by discussing the VARA and DMCA. Third, the article will
discuss how moral rights are protected in the Netherlands. Fourth,
the article will look at cases and examples from the two "main" ar-
eas of copyright law, and will discuss how such cases are handled
in the United States compared to the Netherlands. Fifth, following
the comparison between both systems, the article will discuss pro-
posed changes to existing United States law.
II. COPYRIGHT AND MORAL RIGHTS
A. What is a Copyright?
The United States Constitution specifically affords protection to
the creators of the sciences and arts in the form of copyrights and
patents.43 Copyright law protects works of authorship.44 Owner-
ship of a copyright vests originally in the author, or authors, of the
work.45 Protection arises automatically when three criteria are
met: the work must be original, fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression, and must consist of "expressions" rather than ideas.46
Once an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium
of expression, a copyright exists.47 The Copyright Act considers a
broad range of works of authorship, including literary works, musi-
cal works, dramatic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works,
motion pictures, sound recordings, and architectural works.48 How-
ever, copyright protection for an original work of authorship is not
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
44. CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 435 (4th ed. 2014).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); see also LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 364.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990); see also NARD ETAL., supra note 44, at 435.
47. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 364.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
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extended to abstract things such as ideas, procedures, processes,
systems, concepts, or methods of operation, regardless of how it is
described or explained in the work.49 In addition, a copyright re-
quires no registration, notice, or distribution of copies of the work
in order to obtain the rights granted by the federal Copyright Act.
50
This protection only applies to works created on or after January 1,
1978, the effective date of the Copyright Act.51 Prior to the enact-
ment of the Copyright Act of 1978, there were cumbersome require-
ments on authors to register their copyright, provide notice of cop-
yright upon initial publication, and renew to prevent the work from
entering the public domain, depending on whether the work was
protected by common law copyright or statutory copyright, and pub-
lished or unpublished.
52
The copyright holder is granted a bundle of rights along with the
copyright. Under the Copyright Act, the copyright holder is granted
exclusive rights to exclude others from reproducing the copyrighted
work, to create derivative works based on the copyrighted work, to
distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public, and to pub-
licly perform or display the copyrighted work.
53
B. What are Moral Rights?
Moral rights are rights that provide the creator of a work with
the right to protect the artistic integrity of their work.54 Rather
than viewing copyright as a property right, copyright is viewed as a
way to protect expressive content as an extension of the creator, by
providing the creator with the right to control that expression.55
The term "moral rights" comes from the French phrase droit moral,
and refers to a certain set of non-economic rights that are consid-
ered to be personal to the author.56 Moral rights should be distin-
guished from the economic rights granted in § 106, and the personal
property rights of the owner of a particular copy of the work.57
Moral rights are personal to the author. Furthermore, pursuant to




50. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 364.
51. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16 at 1 (2018).
52. Id. at 2-5.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 321.
54. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 323.
55. Id.
56. Study on the Moral Rights ofAttribution and Integrity, supra note 24, at 7870.
57. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 426.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (1990); see also LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 426.
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Many European countries have based their copyright law on this
rationale, granting copyright protection for moral rights, such as
the right to protect the integrity of the expression from modification
and the right of attribution, which gives the creator the right to be
recognized as the creator of a work.59 Protection of moral rights in
the United States is limited to "works of visual art" as defined in §
101, which is more limited than European copyright law, and are
granted to authors pursuant to § 106A.60
1. The Berne Convention
In 1887, to combat the undue complexity and uneven protection
of copyright on artistic and literary works created by bilateral
agreements, several countries ratified the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886.61 The Berne Con-
vention was created with the idea that the contracting countries
would not discriminate between domestic authors and authors of
other contracting countries regarding the level of protection they
enjoyed for their artistic and literary works.6 2 In addition, the ob-
jective was to harmonize copyright laws between the contracting
states, while at the same time allowing matters like enforcement
and protection of copyrights to remain a matter of national law.
63
The Berne Convention has been revised numerous times since its
creation in 1886.64 Initially, the Convention did not contain a pro-
vision on moral rights.6 5 However, in 1928, following the Confer-
ence of Rome, the Convention was revised and Article 6bis on moral
rights was included.6
6
Article 6bis provides that, apart from the economic rights pro-
vided to the author of an artistic or literary work, the author also
59. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 323.
60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012); LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2, at 323; see also infra
Section Ill-A discussion of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 and the Act's scope of appli-
cation.
61. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 39, at 468-69 (Originally, contracting parties included
countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain and Sweden.); see also WIPO-Administered Treaties, Contracting Parties
Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show-
Results.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=15 (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (Throughout the years numer-
ous countries all over the world have ratified or acceded to the Berne Convention, such as
Japan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Canada, India, Nigeria, South-Africa and the United States).







enjoys certain moral rights.6 7 The author has the right to claim au-
thorship of the work; object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of his work; or any other derogatory action in relation
to his work that will be prejudicial to the author's honor and repu-
tation.68 Essentially, Article 6bis recognizes two main moral rights:
the right of attribution and the right of integrity.6 9 Notably, the
right of integrity, "to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification," does not extend to the level of protection of some
countries where the right of integrity includes the right to object to
the outright destruction of the work.70 "[T]here can be no distortion
when the work itself has been" destroyed.7 1 Further, Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention provides that moral rights can be enforced
after the author's death by those responsible for administration of
the copyright, which is left to the national legislation of the con-
tracting countries.
72
III. MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Unlike many other countries, the United States has not adopted
broad moral rights provisions as part of its federal copyright stat-
ute, the Copyright Act.73 Rather, the protection of moral rights in
the United States is comprised of a combination of federal and state
statutes and common law.74 Even within this limited body of legis-
lation, protection of moral rights is further narrowed, as the United
States only recognizes protection of moral rights for the visual arts
such as paintings, sculptures, and photographs.7 5 Both federal and
state laws solely provide protection for a very limited scope within
the visual arts, and do not apply to any other copyrightable subject
matter. 76
In contrast, most of Continental Europe has a broader form of
moral rights protection, providing protection for a broad range of
works of authorship, including, for instance, literary, musical, and
graphic works.77 The difference between moral rights protection in
67. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=283698 (last vis-
ited Feb. 11, 2018).
68. Id.; see also TRITTON ET AL., supra note 39, at 474.
69. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 at 3 (2018).
70. Id.
71. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, at 8.
72. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 39, at 474.
73. Study on the Moral Rights ofAttribution and Integrity, supra note 24, at 7871.
74. Id.
75. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, at 2; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012).
76. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, at 2.
77. Id. at 1-2.
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the United States and Continental Europe is striking, especially
since Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1988 to comply with
the Berne Convention.78 What is notably important is that in the
United States, moral rights do exist, yet do not rise to the level of
protection as set forth by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.79
This section will focus on United States federal law protecting
moral rights. In particular, this section will discuss the protection
of moral rights under both the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
A. Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)
In 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act, codified
in § 106A of the Copyright Act.80 Section 106A provides for an ad-
ditional set of rights to the author of a work of visual art, often re-
ferred to as the moral rights of attribution and integrity.81 As men-
tioned previously, the United States' protection of moral rights is
very narrow.8 2 In fact, the definition of a "work of visual art" is
extremely detailed and defined as "a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture, existing in a single copy, [or] in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author."83 Further, the definition specifically excludes an extensive
list of works from the definition, such as posters, models, applied
art, motion pictures, books, merchandising items or advertising,
and many other works.
8 4
For the select group of works that do qualify as a work of visual
art, § 106A grants the authors of such works the rights of attribu-
tion and integrity.8 5 The right of attribution includes the right of
the author to "claim authorship to that work, and ... to prevent the
use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which
he or she did not create."86 In addition, the author has the right to
'prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of
78. Id. at 3. While the difference in moral rights protection between Continental Europe
and the United States is interesting considering the fact that both are signatories to the
Berne Convention, this in and of itself constitutes a discussion for a law review article and
therefore is not within the scope of this article.
79. Id. at 9.
80. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2.
81. Id.
82. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, at 2; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a "work of visual art").
84. Id.
85. Id. § 106A.
86. Id. § 106A(a)(1).
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visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modifica-
tion of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation."
8 7
The right of integrity is more narrowly defined.88 Under VARA,
the author has the right "to prevent any intentional distortion, mu-
tilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudi-
cial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that
right. '8 9 Additionally, an author has the right "to prevent any de-
struction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that
right."90 From reading § 106A of the Copyright Act, it is clear that
the protection of moral rights in the United States is very limited
in its scope.
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Beside the Berne Convention, the United States has joined two
additional international treaties that provide for the protection of
moral rights: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).91 While the WCT
incorporated Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, Article 5 of the
WPPT expanded the obligations of contracting parties towards rec-
ognizing the moral rights of attribution and integrity for performers
of live performances and performances fixed in phonograms.92 In
order to comply with its obligations under both treaties, the United
States enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 93
The enactment of the DMCA led to the addition of Chapter 12 to
Title 17, entitled "Copyright Protection and Management Systems"
and contains § 1202, which provides protection for copyright man-
agement information.
94
Section 1202 prohibits knowingly and intentionally providing
false copyright management information, or the distribution or im-
port of false copyright management information.95 Additionally,
the provision also prohibits the removal or alteration of copyright
87. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
88. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 2.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
90. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
91. Study on the Moral Rights ofAttribution and Integrity, supra note 24, at 7872.
92. Id.
93. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (1999).
94. Study on the Moral Rights ofAttribution and Integrity, supra note 24, at 7872-73.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1999).
156 Vol. 57
Moral Rights
management information.96 While facilitating the administration
of the economic rights of an author or right holder, the copyright
management information protections provided by § 1202 may also
have implications on the protection and enforcement of an author
or right holder's moral rights.97 When it comes to moral rights pro-
tection, of particular interest is the second prohibition on removal
or alteration of copyright management information.
The DMCA's definition of copyright management information en-
tails any of the forms of information listed in § 1202(c) that are "con-
veyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or per-
formances or displays of a work, including in digital form," such as
"the name of, and other identifying information about, the author
of a work."98 Therefore, § 1202 makes it an offense to intentionally
remove or alter any mention of the author's name of the work, es-
sentially providing for the protection of the moral right of attribu-
tion.99 By including the author's name in the scope of protection
under § 1202, it seems to suggest that United States copyright law
recognizes a right of attribution not just for authors of "works of
visual art" under VARA, but for authors of all works.10 0 However,
the reality appears a little more complicated, with the majority of
courts recognizing § 1202 as protection against any removal of an
author's attribution, but with a minority only recognizing protec-
tion against removal for attribution that is digital or part of an au-
tomated copyright protection or management system.10 1
IV. MORAL RIGHTS IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE DUTCH
COPYRIGHT ACT
As the above discussion on the Berne Convention has shown,
moral rights in Europe are not harmonized. The language of Article
6bis provides the signatory countries with a broad level of discretion
regarding the implementation of moral rights in their respective
countries.10 2 This level of freedom has, even within Europe, led to
differences in the national approaches of moral rights protection.
96. Id. § 1202(b)(1).
97. Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity, supra note 24, at 7873.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(2).
99. See id. § 1202(b)(1), (c)(2) (1999).
100. See Jane C. Ginsburg, I1. Art and the Law: Suppression and Liberty Have Moral
Rights Come of(Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 12 (2001).
101. Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity, supra note 24, at 7873.
102. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis,
supra note 67, art. 6bis(3) (stating that "the means of redress for safeguarding the rights




The Netherlands acceded to the Berne Convention in October
1912.103 A month earlier, the Netherlands enacted the Auteurswet,
the Dutch Copyright Act.104 In line with Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention, Article 25 of the Dutch Copyright Act provides for the
protection of persoonlijkheidsrechten, or moral rights.10 5 Article
25(1)(a) sets forth the right of attribution, providing the author with
the right to object to making the work public without any mention
of his name or reference to indicate that the author created the
work, unless his objection is unreasonable.10 6 This includes the
right to object to any publication of the work under a different name
than that of the original author, as well as changes to the title of
the work itself or any reference of the author on the work.107
The right of integrity under Dutch Copyright law consists of two
aspects. First, it provides the author with the right to object to any
modification to the work, unless such modification is reasonable.
108
Second, the author always has the right to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or any other form of deterioration of the work which
could negatively impact the honor or name of the author, or value
in its position as the author of the work.10 9 Therefore, even if dis-
tortion or mutilation of the work can be proved, the author must
also show that his name, honor, or reputation as an artist has been
negatively impacted because of the distortion or mutilation of his
work.110 While under Dutch law, the author has to show a detri-
mental impact, this extra requirement is not present under either
French or German law.1 In the end, the distinction between
whether a change to the work is a modification or distortion is a
subjective one.112 However, in 2004, the Dutch Supreme Court in
Jelles held that "mutilation or any other form of deterioration" does
not include the actual total destruction of the work.113 Yet in
103. WIPO-Administered Treaties, Contracting Parties Berne Convention, supra note 61.
104. See exordium to the Auteurswet [Copyright Act] 1912 (Neth.).
105. Article 25 Auteurswet [Copyright Act] (Neth.).
106. Article 25(1)(a) Auteurswet.
107. Article 25(1)(b) Auteurswet.
108. Article 25(1)(c) Auteurswet.
109. Article 25(1)(d) Auteurswet.
110. D.W.F. VERKADE, T&C IE, COMMENTAAR OP ARTICLE 25 AUTEURSWET [Commentary
on Article 25 of the Dutch Copyright Act] para. 4 (2017) (Neth.).
111. See Article L121-1 Code de la propri6t6 intellectuelle (1992) (Fr.); see also Section 14
Enstellung des Werkes, Urheberrechtsgesetz (1965) (Ger.).
112. VERKADE, supra note 110.
113. Id.; see also HR 6 februari 2004, ECLI:NL:PHR:2004:AN7830 (Jelles/De Gemeente
Zwolle) (Neth.), at para. 4.5.
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France, the author can object to the destruction of his work.114 More
surprisingly perhaps is that under § 106A(3)(B) of VARA, an author
also has the right to object to the destruction of a work of recognized
stature. 115
Moral rights under Dutch law are non-transferable.116 Even after
the original author transfers his or her copyright, the moral rights
remain with the original author.117 In other words, when the author
parts with their copyright, moral rights are not included.118 In ad-
dition, moral rights in the Netherlands are not perpetual-they are
not automatically passed on to heirs after the author's death.119
However, the author can elect to have his rights pass on through
testament.120 Furthermore, an author can waive his or her rights
away by contract.121 Contrastingly, while in France moral rights
are also considered non-alienable, they are considered to be perpet-
ual, in that the rights pass on to the heirs of the author, are impre-
scriptible, and cannot be waived.122 In Germany, moral rights are
inheritable, but not transferable, unless transferred in execution of
a testamentary disposition or to co-heirs as part of the partition of
an estate.
123
V. COMPARISON - CASE STUDIES
To show the difference in treatment of moral rights of authors in
the United States versus the Netherlands, two separate examples
will be discussed. The first example will discuss moral rights pro-
tection in the context of visual arts, more specifically architecture.
The second example will discuss moral rights in the context of mu-
sical compositions.
114. See Andr6 Lucas, Moral Right in France: Towards a Pragmatic Approach?, BRITISH
LITERARY & ARTISTIC COPYRIGHT ASS'N, http://www.blaca.org/Moralo20righto20ino20
France%20by%2oProfessor%2oAndre%2oLucas.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(3)(B) (2012) (subject to the limitations set out in id. § 113(d)).
116. VERKADE, supra note 110, at para. la.
117. Article 25(1) Auteurswet.
118. VERKADE, supra note 110, at para. la.
119. Id. at para. 6.
120. Article 25(2), (4) Auteurswet.
121. VERKADE, supra note 110, at para. lb (Under Dutch contract law the author is able
to transfer his rights under Article 25 to another contracting party.).
122. Article L121-1 Code de la propri6t6 intellectuelle (Fr.); see also Lucas, supra note 114.
123. See Section 28-29 Enstellung des Werkes, Urheberrechtsgesetz (Ger.).
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A. Visual Arts -Architecture
In 1820, Naturalis Institute was established as the Rijksmuseum
van Natuurlijke Historie,124 in Leiden, the Netherlands.125 The ini-
tial focus of the institute was on scientific research and building a
collection, rather than exhibitions.126 In 1986, the decision was
made to turn the institute in a museum for the public, and the gov-
ernment made a former Seventeenth Century Pesthuis, or Plague
House,127 available for this purpose. Soon the decision was made to
build a new building across from the Pesthuis and connect the two
with a walking bridge.128 In 1998, the Nationaal Natuurhistorisch
Museum Naturalis was built, pursuant to the design of architect
Fons Verheijen.
129
Fifteen years later, it became evident that the building could not
cope with the increased number of visitors.130  The decision was
made to expand and restructure the building. On April 24, 2013,
through a European bidding process, the project was eventually
awarded to Neutelings Riedijk Architecten (NRA), even though the
original architect Verheijen also participated.131 NRA's design in-
cluded building a new structure, which would function as the mu-
seum, and using the old building as a depot and research facility. 132
NRA's plan would no longer include the Pesthuis as part of the mu-
seum.133 Additionally, NRA's plan also included the destruction of
the walking bridge, as it would no longer serve any purpose, and
the destruction of the Darwin House, an office building on the prop-
erty of Naturalis.134 After learning about NRA's plan, Verheijen
objected to NRA's design on the grounds that it infringed his moral
124. Translation in English: National Museum for Natural History.
125. Rb. Den Haag 25 januari 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:555 (Verheijen/Stichting Nat-
uralis Biodiversity Center) (Neth.), at 2.1.
126. Id.
127. Pesthuis, WIKIPEDIA, https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pesthuis#cite-note-I (last visited
Apr. 7, 2018) (Plague houses were created in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries in the
Netherlands to isolate people with the plague from the general population in Dutch cities).
128. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 2.1.
129. Monica Leenders, Auteursrecht als middel am verboi wing to voorkomen, IE-FORUM
(May 15, 2017), http://www.ie-forum.nl/artikelen/monica-leenders-auteursrecht-als-middel-
om-verbouwing-te-voorkomen.
130. Id.; see also Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at
2.16.
131. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 2.17; see also
Joost Poort, Ceci n'est pas un Verheijen, IE-FORUM (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.ie-fo-
rum.nl/artikelen/auteursrechtdebat-joost-poort-ceci-n-est-pas-un-verheijen; Leenders, supra
note 129.
132. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 2.19.
133. Id.; see also Leenders, supra note 129.
134. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 2.19.
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rights as the original architect pursuant to Article 25(1)(c) and (d)
of the Dutch Copyright Act.
135
The case went to trial, and the lower court in the Hague decided
in favor of Verheijen.136 In January 2017, the court concluded in an
interlocutory judgment that Naturalis with the proposed remodel-
ing infringed Verheijen's droit au respect-his moral right to object
to any modification or mutilation of his work. 137 The court reasoned
that, as for the destruction of the Darwin House, Verheijen did not
have a claim under Article 25, pursuant to the decision in Jelles, in
which an architect cannot prevent the destruction of a building by
relying on Article 25, nor can he prove that Naturalis had misused
their authority in deciding on demolition.
138
While the court did not find an infringement of moral rights re-
garding the new addition to the museum, it did find that the pro-
posed remodeling of the museum, the modifications to the building
itself, went to the core of the architect's design, qualifying it as a
"distortion, mutilation, or any other form of deterioration of the
work" under Article 15(1)(d) of the Dutch Copyright Act.139 The
court continued by stating that this "mutilation or deterioration" to
the work negatively impacts the name and honor of the architect.140
Verheijen had sufficiently proved such negative impact by arguing
that the Naturalis building is the most important building in his
oeuvre, because in a short period of time it had already received
over three million visitors, and that it is the only building in which
the Naturalis welcomes visitors, making it the embodiment of the
museum.141
However, Verheijen, at the same time, reluctantly saw the re-
modeling of the museum proceed and claimed in a subsequent sum-
mary proceeding that his work was still being deteriorated.142 On
March 7, 2017, the court ordered Naturalis to immediately cease
the remodeling and building procedures, awaiting the court's final
ruling in the underlying proceeding.142 Eventually, the parties set-
tled on March 20, 2017, with Verheijen waiving his moral rights
135. Id. at 2.18, 3.2.9; see also Leenders, supra note 129.
136. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 5; see also
Leenders, supra note 129.
137. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 4.32; see also
Leenders, supra note 129.
138. Verheijen/Stichting Naturalis Biodiversity Center, 25 januari 2017, at 4.4-4.7.
139. Id. at 4.17-18.
140. Id. at 4.18.
141. Id. at 4.19.
142. See Rb. Den Haag 7 maart 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:2739 (Verheijen/Stichting
Naturalis Biodiversity Center) (Neth.), at 3.2.
143. Id. at 4.19, 5.
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after receiving 1.5 million EUR for an architecture foundation to be
founded by Verheijen, litigation costs, attorney's fees, and a com-
pensation to Verheijen himself.
144
Although in the end, the architect in Naturalis chose to waive his
moral rights, a case like this would likely never arise in the United
States. While architectural works enjoy copyright protection,145 ar-
chitectural works do not fall within the limited scope of moral rights
protection provided by VARA. 146 This means that as an architect in
the United States, if the party you designed a building for wants to
make modifications to your original design of the building, they are
free to do so. Apart from the visual works of art that are provided
moral rights protection, other copyrighted work is generally treated
as part of a business deal. Once that deal has been concluded, the
work is finished and you have no rights or say in what happens to
the work. And that is exactly what the analogy to the Naturalis
case reflects: in the United States, your rights end once the business
deal concludes.
147
B. Non-visual Arts - Musical Compositions
Apart from architectural works being excluded from the scope of
application of VARA, there are several other types of works that are
excluded, such as musical compositions. Back in the 1990s, in the
heyday of music genres such as Euro-house, moral rights protection
in the Netherlands provided the widow of composer Carl Orff with
the right to object to a house-version of part of her late husband's
musical composition Carmina Burana.14 8  In 1936, German com-
poser Carl Orff composed Carmina Burana, of which 0 Fortuna is
the first movement.149 In 1982, Orff passed away.150 Under Ger-
man law, the moral rights passed to his widow, who subsequently
transferred the rights to Schott, one of the plaintiffs, in addition to
144. Leenders, supra note 129; see also Naturalis, Schikking bereikt tussen Naturalis en
Verheijen, https://www.naturalis.nl/nl/over-ons/nieuws/pers/persberichten/schikking-bereikt
-tussen-naturalis-en-verheijen/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012) (granting copyright protection to architectural works).
146. Id. § 101 (While VARA provides a definition of "architectural work," it does not in-
clude architectural works in its definition of "work of visual art," therefore excluding it from
moral rights protection).
147. Note that there is a difference between an architectural work and a work that is part
of a building. See, e.g., Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., No. 13-CV-05612, 2018 WL 851374, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding that the property owner's destruction by whitewashing
the works of a group of graffiti street artists on buildings denied the artists the opportunity
to remove their work and violated their rights under VARA).
148. See Rb. Amsterdam, 24 februari 1992, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1992:AM2039 (Musikverlag
B. Schott's S6hne/Indisc Nederland) (Neth.).
149. Id. at 1(a).
150. Id. at 1(b).
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granting her the right to participate in the lawsuit on her behalf.151
Stichting Stemra152 held the reproduction rights to the works of Orff
in the Netherlands.153 Defendants in this case, Indisc Nederland
BV and Red Bullet International BV, both marketed CDs in the
Netherlands containing the song 0 Fortuna, respectively performed
by Apotheosis and Fortuna.154 One was a house version of Orffs 0
Fortuna, the other a disco/pop version, ranking third and first in
the Dutch National Top 40.155
On February 14, 1992, Stemra notified the entire Dutch music
industry, including Red Bullet and Indisc, that further production
and distribution of unauthorized adaptations of the work Carmina
Burana, 0 Fortuna by Orff were forbidden, as the right-holders to
the original work never gave permission nor were willing to do so
after the fact.156 While Indisc refused to cease the sale of 0 Fortuna
by Apotheosis, Red Bullet filed suit against Stemra, seeking to have
Stemra nullify the notice that was issued to the Dutch music indus-
try regarding Orffs work.157 Stemra counter argued that Red Bul-
let marketed a modified and mutilated version of Orffs 0 Fortuna
without Stemra's permission.158 Schott joined, arguing Red Bullet
violated Orffs moral rights.
159
More specifically, in relation to moral rights, both argued that
Red Bullet's version included a modification of Orffs composition,
to which the court agreed.16 0 After listening to Orffs original com-
position and Red Bullet's version, the court concluded that there
were parts of Orffs composition left out, such as the introduction,
but that several elements were added, such as a disco-rhythm and
horse whinnying.16 1 The court considered this to be a modification
of Orffs work.16 2 Taking into account the nature and extent of these




152. Now known as Bumra/Stemra, and is a Dutch organization for the interests of com-
posers, poets, and music-publishers in the field of copyright. See also STICHTING
BUMRA/STEMRA, https://www.bumastemra.nl/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
153. See Musikverlag B. Schott's S6hne/Indisc Nederland, 24 februari 1992, at 1(c).
154. Id. at 1(d)-(e).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1(g).
157. Id. at 1(h), 3.
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. at 8.






Denying Red Bullet's request, the court concluded that Stemra
was justified in forbidding the further sale of the unauthorized mod-
ifications of 0 Fortuna by Orff, including the one by Red Bullet.16 4
Regarding Indisc, the court found that Apotheosis's version of 0
Fortuna was not a parody, but rather a total, albeit altered copy of
the work by Orff.
165
The 0 Fortuna case is again an example of a case that would not
arise in the United States in the context of moral rights protection.
While United States law provides copyright protection for the in-
fringement of copyright, a composer such as Carl Orff cannot after
the sale of the copyrighted work prevent any modification or muti-
lation of his work. This again shows that the United States' moral
rights protection is too narrow, and its arbitrary distinction even
between the visual arts can have a severe impact on authors of
works other than a painting or sculpture. Does United States cop-
yright law really promote the advancement of the fine arts and sci-
ences, as purported in the United States Constitution, when only a
very select group of authors has the ability to prevent any modifi-
cation or mutilation to their oeuvre?
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
As the examples above have shown, moral rights protection in the
United States is very limited in scope. The scope of protection of-
fered by VARA is too narrow and arbitrarily protects certain types
of art, while DMCA's scope of protection, if any, remains uncertain.
In the United States, copyright law was enacted to promote the ad-
vancement of the arts and sciences.166 As such, one of the primary
goals of copyright law is to protect the rights of all authors, provided
that the work satisfies all requirements for protection.16 7 Neither
the United States Constitution nor the Copyright Act make a dis-
tinction between the types of work that are offered copyright protec-
tion.1 68 In addition, neither state that such protection should be
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 20.
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
167. See generally id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102. Provided that the author's work is original,
fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and consists of expressions rather than ideas, the
author is granted automatic copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
168. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102.
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afforded to visual artists only, let alone a select group of visual art-
ists.169 Yet, when it comes to moral rights protection, an arbitrary
distinction is made between copyrightable works.170 After looking
into the current scope of moral rights protection in the United
States, moral rights protection in the Netherlands, and applying
the laws to two factual scenarios, the United States Copyright Of-
fice should expand copyright protection.
First, the United States Copyright Office should lobby for the ex-
pansion of the moral rights of integrity and attribution to all copy-
rightable works. A first step would include broadening § 101's def-
inition of "work of visual art" to include forms of visual art other
than paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures. Examples of vis-
ual arts that should be granted protection, and therefore included
in the definition, are works of architecture, photography, illustra-
tions, and motion pictures. By broadening the definition, the moral
rights granted in § 106A will cover a wider variety of visual arts,
not just the classic visual arts. This recommendation is further sup-
ported by the Coalition of Visual Artists (CVA), 171 who in their ini-
tial comments to the Copyright Office's request, advocate that the
rights granted in § 106A should apply to all works of visual art, not
just "fine art."172 Specifically, the CVA found that VARA insuffi-
ciently protects commercial photography, illustrations, and other
visual works.173 The CVA also argues that original images pro-
duced by artists of commercial art - any art, design, illustration and
photography created for advertising, publication, and other com-
mercial purposes - are no different in artistic merit than the "fine
art" protected by VARA, and in fact reach a much wider audience
than most "fine art. ' 174 The Artists Rights Society (ARS) echoes this
proposition, stating that the current class of works of visual art is
too narrow and excludes a wide variety of art such as conceptual
art, recorded performance art, digital art, large print editions, illus-
trations, and most photography.175 The ARS concluded that moral
rights protection would be significantly more effective if it would
apply to all pictorial, graphical, and sculptural works.
176
169. Id.
170. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A ("[T]he author ofa work of visual art").
171. The Coalition of Visual Artists encompasses various organizations, including: Amer-
ican Photographic Artists, the Graphic Artists Guild, the North American Nature Photog-
raphy Association, and Professional Photographers of America. THE COALITION OF VISUAL
ARTISTS, STUDY ON THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY 26 (2017).
172. Id. at 13.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3.




However, the expansion of moral rights protection should not
stop there. Broadening the scope of VARA will still leave out other
forms of copyrightable works of art, namely works of art that are
not visual, such as musical compositions and literature. There does
not seem to be any reasoning behind this hierarchy of art: "It's not
clear to us why someone who is not the author of a work of visual
art does not have [the right of attribution] ."177 While such types of
works are offered protection through copyright infringement to a
certain extent, a composer would not have any ability to seek pro-
tection for infringement once his rights are sold or assigned. The
sale or assignment of copyrights is treated as a business deal and
once the deal is concluded, you as the original creator of the work
have no further say in what happens to it. But moral rights on the
other hand, remain with the author of a copyrightable work, even
after sale, unless the author expressly waives his rights.178 That is
exactly what makes moral rights protection valuable to artists.
Therefore, a second recommendation would be to ensure moral
rights protection is provided to authors of non-visual art as well.
Every type of artist should be offered the equal opportunity to allege
the infringement of his right of attribution or integrity, to protect
his connection to the work and prevent any prejudice to his honor
and reputation as an artist.
By expanding and clarifying the scope of protection of moral
rights to the types of work covered, the uncertainty that currently
exists under the DMCA will also be resolved. Since § 1202 of the
DMCA makes it an offense to intentionally remove or alter the cop-
yright management information of a work, including any mention
of the author's name, it suggests that United States Copyright law
recognizes a right of attribution outside the scope of VARA. 179 A
simple clarification of works deserving of moral rights protection
would resolve this uncertainty. Subsequently, a third recommen-
dation would be for the DMCA to start actively recognizing the right
of attribution for works covered under the DMCA. Additionally, it
has been become more common to remove copyright management
information, often including the author's name, from digitized
works.180 The Coalition of Visual Artists argues that while § 1202
protection might work for digitized music and film, it seems to be
177. KERNOCHAN CENTER FOR LAW, MEDIA AND THE ARTS, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL,
COMMENTS OF THE KERNOCHAN CENTER FOR LAW, MEDIA AND THE ARTS, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL 6 (2017).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2012).
179. See supra Section Ill-B.
180. THE COALITION FOR VISUAL ARTISTS, supra note 171, at 13-14.
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completely disregarded by search engines, internet pirates, or the
general public.18 1 The Coalition further argues that there are vari-
ous additional ways attribution may be provided for a work; it can
be visible or shown with the image, but it can also be included in
the metadata or a digital watermark of the work.
18 2
While moral rights protection in the United States should be ex-
tended to encompass all copyrightable works, but like in the Neth-
erlands, this protection should not be perpetual. Perpetual moral
rights protection, as in France, is not only burdensome, but also un-
fair by essentially allowing heirs of an author to make a claim under
the right of attribution or integrity for eternity. Therefore, moral
rights protection in the United States should only apply to works
that are not in the public domain, effectively granting moral rights
protection for the term of a copyright. This is also supported by the
American Association of Law Libraries (AALL), who in its initial
response to the Copyright Office's request, in the context of literary
works, argued that moral rights protections should not apply to
works in the public domain.1 83 The AALL believes that a robust
public domain will enable authors to create new works and that new
moral rights protections would add additional requirements for au-
thors who want to republish or make derivative works based on
works in the public domain.18 4 If different regimes of rights expire
at different times, this would create tremendous confusion for po-
tential authors, and potentially even discourage innovative compi-
lations or derivative works from multiple public domain works be-
cause the requirement to attribute will be burdensome.18 5 The
AALL in its comments further refers to Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights, who stated that "a federal statute enacted under the
Copyright clause that purports to grant a moral right of integrity
for certain works in perpetuity would be clearly unconstitu-
tional."18 6 Furthermore, in the context of trademarks, the United
States Supreme Court held in Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox that requiring attribution for a television program would
lead to a perpetual patent and copyright, and accordingly deemed
181. Id. at 14.
182. Id.
183. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, STUDY ON THE MORAL RIGHTS OF
ATTRIBUTIONAND INTEGRITY 1 (2017). Cf. ARTISTS RIGHTS SOCIETY, supra note 175 (arguing
that the protection offered by VARA should preferably be perpetual, if not at the very least
co-terminus with the copyright term).
184. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, supra note 183.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Film Integrity Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 2400, Subcomm. On Courts,




it unconstitutional.8 7 Therefore, if moral rights were recognized in
United States law in general, for the term of a copyright, many un-
certainties accompanying existing United States law will be elimi-
nated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus, the current laws in the United States do not sufficiently
protect the moral rights of authors. Both VARA and the DMCA are
not effective in providing protections for authors, if any at all. The
law is both too narrow and uncertain to provide full coherent pro-
tection. As such, it is recommended that the United States Copy-
right Office looks to the Netherlands as a reference and implements
aspects of Dutch law by expanding the category of "works of visual
art" under VARA, and by expanding moral rights protection to non-
visual works of art in order to provide for a better recognition and
protection of moral rights for all authors in the United States.
187. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003); see also THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, supra note 183.
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